Vasseleu, Cathryn. “Virtual Bodies/Virtual Worlds.” Virtual Politics: Identity and Community in Cyberspace. Ed. David Holmes. London: Sage, 1997. 46-58.
Vasseleu begins her piece by very briefly defining both cyberspace and virtual realities. She identifies cyberspace, on the one hand, as “the space within the electronic network of computers from which virtual realities, among other things, can be made” (46). Virtual realities, on the other hand, as “computer-generated system which use cyberspace to simulate various aspects of interactive space (that is, they are inhabitable computer systems of space)” (46). Saying that cyberspace is used to make “virtual realities, among other things” makes it sound like quite a malleable material. Her reason for positioning space in this way is because she seeks to parallel the space of the body and the space of the computer throughout the essay.
Vasseleu’s main argument is looking at “the material consequences of perspectives which disavow the corporeal basis of virtual technologies” (47). What I think she is getting at here is the way that our physical bodies are disconnected from what happens on screen. Even when we have some sort of avatar “in-world”, without any sort of sensory feedback loop between our physical and digital selves, our experience is flawed from the outset. In other words, our presence in virtual realities is troubled by this sense of disembodiment. To try to put this in context, I understand what she is saying through my experiences in Second Life. I see my “Mini-Me” running around the virtual environment; I know that I control it; it is supposed to be me, right? And yet I am always aware of my physical body that is at the controls. Vasseleu’s point is that in this relationship I have little sense of being embodied in my SL avatar.
So what is the big deal? Why does examining embodiment matter? “Many of the paradoxes and ethical concerns which appear to have been generated by virtual technologies,” says Vasseleu, “are themselves a kind of ‘emergent behaviour’ – unprogrammed effects generated within the tensions of more familiar systems of representation which have supposedly been disrupted and displaces” (47 emphasis added). Embodiment matters because virtual realities create an almost-but-not-quite condition among individual, avatar and space. What I see my (digital) body doing and what I feel in my (physical) body do not match up. Being disembodied in cyberspace, which is visually remarkably similar to physical space, leads to issues that we, as a society, have not had to deal with before. Vasseleu’s answer to these new concerns is the “virtual environment suit” (VE suit). Actually, embodiment tech operates on different levels. It begins with the VE helmet, then the VE glove, and culminates in the VE suit, which is the third and most complete embodiment experience. Each magnitude of embodiment (helmet, glove and suit) offers the user a deeper sense of being in the space and Vasseleu does a nice job of relating them to discussions of Kant, Copernicus and Descartes. With these heavy-hitters she addresses the relationship between vision and touch, as well as the how subjectivity of the individual plays in to spatial experiences.
Vasseleu points out that “the possession of an occupiable dimension has become the most urgent agenda of the agent/observer, the significance of simulation lies in its subjective legitimation of new imagined universal territories” (49). At the end of her piece, Vasseleu tries to tie her discussion of embodiment and spaces to an idea about gender. She mentions gender at the beginning when she that she is interested in “the extent to which such perspectives [which disavow the corporeal basis of virtual technologies] reproduce modes of embodiment with which many women are already familiar” (47). Essentially, I think she is pointing out the need to examine the consequences of equating bodies with spaces, as places to be conquered; and, she says, women have had to deal with this sort of thinking in relation to their bodies for a long time. This seems to be a valid and interesting tract to take, but Vasseleu only returns to gender in the last couple of paragraphs. Gender ends up, for me, feeling like an afterthought.
2 comments:
Interesting piece of information. I am wondering about the "almost, but not quite" point you bring up. Does she address what this feeling does psychologically over time. I'm thinking about the social issues of many of the people who are attracted to virtual reality. Does this out of physicality feeling create dischord for them when entering (or more so engaging in the social aspects of) the real world. One of my articles discusses hyperreality in terms of having to readjust to the lesser amount of visual detail when offline. It might be a term that you check out. Effective explanation overall; I found it interesting.
I agree with Korie that this article sounds interesting. Unfortunately, it is something upon which I stumbled at the very end of my project, and then only in thought and not in research. It is great to know that someone is out their talking about the physicality of one's body, both in cyberspace and reality. I am particularly intersted in now that translates into choice. Does the click of a mouse trigger a different moral decision than say, the click of a spacebar on a computer?
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